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Case Comments
Collateral Estoppel in Section 1983 Actions After
Stone v. Powell: McCurry v. Allen
Undercover police officers went to the home of Willie McCurry after receiving a tip that he was selling heroin. Two of
the officers knocked on the door and, when McCurry answered,
asked if they could buy some heroin "caps." McCurry left for a
moment and then returned, firing a weapon at the officers. A
gun battle ensued, and the officers arrested McCurry. After
McCurry's removal from the scene, police searched his residence and discovered heroin. A Missouri state court ruled the
search constitutional and found McCurry guilty of both possession of heroin and assault with intent to kill.1 McCurry subsequently filed a civil rights action for damages under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983,2 naming as defendants the police officers involved and
the City of St. Louis Police Department. The complaint alleged,
among other things,3 that the search of his home was unconstitutional.4 In response, the defendants argued that the doctrine
of collateral estoppel 5 precluded relitigation of the search and
1.

State v. McCurry, No. 77-862 (Mo. Cir. Ct. Jan. 6, 1978), affid, 587 S.W.2d

337 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978), motion for rehearingand/or transfer denied, No. 39999
(Mo. Ct. App. Sept. 17, 1979). The trial court admitted evidence that had been
in plain view of the searching officers but suppressed evidence "found in drawers or among tires." Ruling on motion to suppress, State v. McCurry, No. 77-862
(Mo. Cir. Ct. Oct. 6, 1977) (denying in part and sustaining in part defendant's
motion).
2. Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
3. The complaint also alleged that the police officers had assaulted McCurry upon his arrest. McCurry v. Allen, 606 F.2d 795, 797 (8th Cir. 1979), cert.
granted, 100 S.Ct. 1012 (1980).
4. Id.
5. Collateral estoppel makes prior determinations of fact or law binding
on parties in subsequent suits if the determinations were fully litigated and
necessary to the prior judgment, even if the prior suit was based on a different
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seizure claim. On this basis, the federal district court granted a
summary judgment for the defendants. 6 On appeal, a threejudge panel of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that a state court determination on the constitutionality of a search and seizure is not to be given collateral
estoppel effect in a section 1983 action.7 McCurry v. Allen, 606
F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 1012 (1980).
The United States Supreme Court has not yet decided
whether state criminal determinations should be given collateral estoppel effect in section 1983 actions, 8 nor, prior to McCurry, had the Eighth Circuit.9 Seven other circuits, however,
cause of action. Collateral estoppel thus differs from the other components of
the doctrine of res judicata, merger and bar, which prevent relitigation of the
same cause of action regardless of the particular issues raised. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 47(a), 48, 68 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973). See gen-

erally Developments in the Law-Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARv. L.
REV. 1133, 1331-33 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Developments]. The res judicata
rules followed by federal courts are supported by 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1976). Section 1738 implements the full faith and credit clause, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
See note 29 infra.
6. McCurry v. Allen, 466 F. Supp. 514, 516 (E.D. Mo. 1978).
7. The Eighth Circuit panel remanded the case to district court, but
stayed proceedings until the Missouri state court decided McCurry's direct appeal of his criminal conviction. 606 F.2d at 799. The Eighth Circuit stated that it
would be compelled to abstain completely until the matter had been settled in
the Missouri courts if McCurry were seeking an injunction or a declaratory
judgment. Id. (citing Judice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 333-36 (1977); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 604-07 (1975); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971)).
The court further noted that the Supreme Court has explicitly avoided ruling
whether federal courts must abstain from deciding damage claims in such situations. 606 F.2d at 799 (citing Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. at 339 n.16). Nonetheless,
the Eighth Circuit stated that "[i]n deference to the state courts .... we believe it appropriate to abstain under the present circumstances." 606 F.2d at
799. The court said that the plaintiff would probably go without relief for a
number of years, indicating that this result is "the price exacted by our federalstate court system." Id. The court also held that the district court judge erred
in granting summary judgment without considering McCurry's assault claim.
Id. at 797.
8. See Ellis v. Dyson, 421 U.S. 426, 440 (1975) (Powell, J., dissenting); Florida State Bd. of Dentistry v. Mack, 401 U.S. 960, 961-62 (1971) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). The Court has suggested in dictum, however,
that aspects of the res judicata doctrine, including collateral estoppel, will apply in such cases. See Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 606 n.18 (1975);
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 554 n.12 (1974); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
475, 497 (1973). But see id. at 509 n.14 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Lauchli v.
United States, 405 U.S. 965, 965-68 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari). See generally Theis, Res Judicatain Civil Rights Act Cases: An Introduction to the Problem, 70 Nw. U.L REv. 859, 862-65 (1976); Developments,
supra note 5, at 1331 n.1.
9. The court had previously ruled, however, that res judicata would apply
in a federal section 1983 action brought after a state civil proceeding. See Robbins v. District Court, 592 F.2d 1015, 1018 (8th Cir. 1979); Goodrich v. Supreme
Court, 511 F.2d 316, 318 (8th Cir. 1975). The court had also applied res judicata
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have either held or stated in dictum that state criminal decisions should be given collateral estoppel effect in federal court
actions under section 1983.10 A number of federal district
courts have reached similar conclusions." Most of these circuit
and district courts decided the issue before 1975, when the
Supreme Court significantly limited access'to federal forums
for persons convicted of crimes in state courts. In Stone v. Poweli,12 the Court held that "where the State has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment
claim, a state prisoner may not be granted federal habeas
corpus relief on the ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his trial."13 The
principles to issues of misconduct in employment that were separable from the
constitutional claims alleged by a plaintiff. See Jenson v. Olson, 353 F.2d 825,
829 (8th Cir. 1965).
10. See cases cited in McCurry, 606 F.2d at 797 nn.2-8. Only the Seventh
and Ninth Circuits have yet to rule on the question. In Brubaker v. King, 505
F.2d 534, 537-38 (7th Cir. 1974), the Seventh Circuit stated that the issue of probable cause litigated at a state suppression hearing was different from the section 1983 issue of whether the law enforcement officer acted in good faith and
with reasonable belief that there was probable cause, and that the state court
ruling therefore could not have collateral estoppel effect. In Ney v. California,
439 F.2d 1285 (9th Cir. 1971), the Ninth Circuit held that requirements foi collateral estoppel were not met because the state court had not decided the constitutional issue, and commented that adherence to normal collateral estoppel
rules in federal section 1983 actions would make the Civil Rights Act "a dead
letter." Id. at 1288.
11. See, e.g., Smith v. Sinclair, 424 F. Supp. 1108, 1111-12 (W.D. Okla. 1976);
Moran v. Mitchell, 354 F. Supp. 86, 88-89 (E.D. Va. 1973). These cases are cited
in McCurry v. Allen, 606 F.2d at 798 n.9.
Most commentators disagree with the courts and argue for a variety of exceptions to collateral estoppel for section 1983 actions. See, e.g., Averitt, Federal
Section 1983 Actions After State Court Judgments, 44 U. CoLO. L. REv. 191, 19596 (1972); McCormack, Federalism and Section 1983: Limitations on Judicial
Enforcement of ConstitutionalClaims, Part II, 60 VA. L REv. 250, 286-91 (1974);
Theis, supra note 8, at 872-81; Developments, supra note 5, at 1338-43; Comment,
The CollateralEstoppel Effect of State Criminal Convictions in Section 1983 Actions, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 95, 100-06. See also Note, The Preclusive Effect of State
Judgments on Subsequent 1983 Actions, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 610, 616-17 (1978)
(collateral estoppel should apply unless section 1983 plaintiff was not provided
with a "'full and fair' hearing" in state court).
12. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
13. Id. at 494 (footnotes omitted). Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1976), a person
held in custody on a state criminal conviction may bring a federal habeas
corpus action for his release if he has exhausted his state remedies and can
demonstrate that his conviction was unconstitutional. See 3 W. LAFAvE,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 11.7(f), at 750 (1978). For the history of this statute, see
note 38 infra. Prior to 1976, the year Stone was decided, federal habeas corpus
relief was available to a person whose state court convictions rested upon evidence obtained from illegal searches and seizures. See Kaufman v. United
States, 394 U.S. 217, 225 (1969). The Stone decision has been sharply criticized.
E.g., Robbins & Sanders, JudicialIntegrity, the Appearance of Justice, and the
Great Writ of Habeas Corpus: How to Kill Two Thirds (or More) with One
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Court rejected the argument that a special federal interest is
served by allowing federal collateral review in the context of
habeas corpus.
Before Stone, the availability of federal habeas corpus
based on fourth amendment violations was a factor that influenced some federal courts to apply collateral estoppel in section 1983 actions. In fact, several of the judges who ruled that
collateral estoppel principles should apply in section 1983 actions premised their decisions upon the existence of the habeas
corpus remedy.14 Given this background, it is not surprising
that Stone resulted in a reassessment of the application of collateral estoppel in section 1983 actions.' 5 For example, in Clark
v. Lutcher,16 a Pennsylvania federal district court acknowledged that plaintiffs are collaterally estopped from relitigating
facts decided at a previous state criminal trial, but held that the
federal courts are "free to apply federal law in a different manner to the same facts."' 7 Clark, like McCurry, involved a section 1983 action. The state court found that there was probable
cause for Clark's arrest, and he subsequently brought a section
1983 claim based on the fourth amendment.18 The Clark court
reasoned that, because Stone had cut off the plaintiff's right to
federal collateral review by means of habeas corpus, application of collateral estoppel would effectively deny the plaintiff
access to a federal forum to litigate his civil rights claim. The
court therefore refused to give collateral estoppel effect to the
state court determination that there was probable cause for the
plaintiff's arrest.' 9
In McCurry v. Allen, the Eighth Circuit panel adopted a
Stone, 15 Am. Cane. L. REav. 63 (1977).

See generally 3 W. LAFAvE, supra,

§ 11.7(f), at 751-54.
14. See Rimmer v. Fayetteville Police Dep't, 567 F.2d 273, 276 (4th Cir.
1977); Thistlethwaite v. City of New York, 497 F.2d 339, 343 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1093 (1974); Moran v. Mitchell, 354 F. Supp. 86, 88-89 (E.D. Va.
1973).
15. A number of circuit court cases explicitly noted that the specter of
Stone might call into question the policy of applying collateral estoppel in cer-

tain section 1983 cases. Rimmer v. Fayetteville Police Dep't, 567 F.2d 273, 276
(4th Cir. 1977); Meadows v. Evans, 550 F.2d 345, 346 (5th Cir. 1977) (Goldberg, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 969 (1977). At

least one commentator predicted that Stone might lead to reassessment of collateral estoppel rules for section 1983 actions. Comment, Restrictions on Access
to Federal Courtsin Civil Rights Actions: The Role of Abstention and Res Judicata, 6 FORDHAm URn. L.J. 481, 497-98 (1978).
16. 436 F. Supp. 1266 (M.D. Pa. 1977).

17. Id. at 1272.
18. See id. at 1268, 1272.
19. Id. at 1272.
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similar rationale, 20 and expressly limited its holding to illegal
search and seizure claims brought under section 1983 by persons denied federal habeas relief after Stone.21 The court
noted that only two of the circuit court decisions that have held
or stated the view that collateral estoppel applies in section
1983 actions involved illegal search and seizure claims, and that
both of these were decided prior to Stone.22 The court in McCurry also observed that the decisions of the other circuits in
which collateral estoppel was applied emphasized the existence of habeas corpus as an alternative means of access to federal forums. 2 3 The panel concluded "that because of the special
role of federal courts in protecting civil rights,. .
habeas corpus is now unavailable to appellant,

.

and because
.it is our

. .

duty to consider fully, unencumbered by the doctrine of collat24
eral estoppel, appellant's § 1983 claims."
20. The court did not cite the Clark case, although it was briefed by the
plaintiff. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 14-15, McCurry v. Allen, 606 F.2d 795
(8th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 1012 (1980).
21. 606 F.2d at 798. For a discussion of the scope of the court's ruling, see
note 25 infra.
22. 606 F.2d at 798 (citing Metros v. United States Dist. Court, 441 F.2d 313
(10th Cir. 1971); Mulligan v. Schlachter, 389 F.2d 231 (6th Cir. 1968)).
23. 606 F.2d at 798 (citing Rimmer v. Fayetteville Police Dep't, 567 F.2d 273
(4th Cir. 1977); Thistlethwaite v. City of New York, 497 F.2d 339 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1093 (1974); Moran v. Mitchell, 354 F. Supp. 86 (E.D. Va. 1973).
The court in McCurry incorrectly cited Alexander v. Emerson, 489 F.2d 285 (5th
Cir. 1973) (per curiam), as a case in which the court's resort to collateral estoppel in a section 1983 action was premised on the availability of habeas relief.
606 F.2d at 798. Collateral estoppel was not at issue in Alexander. That case
does, however, provide some support for McCurry because the Alexander court
relied on the possibility that the plaintiff could gain habeas relief as a justification for dismissing his section 1983 action.
24. 606 F.2d at 799 (citing Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972), for the
proposition that federal courts have a special role to play in protecting civil
rights). As further support for its conclusion that Stone necessitated the preservation of access to the federal forum by means of section 1983 actions, the McCurry court noted that "Chief Justice Burger in his concurring opinion in Stone
v. Powell partially justified rendering habeas corpus unavailable as a remedy
for fourth amendment claims on the basis that alternative remedies were still
available." 606 F.2d at 799. The Eighth Circuit reasoned that a section 1983
damage action "is clearly one of the more obvious of such alternative remedies." Id. It may be a mistake, however, to infer that Chief Justice Burger's
comment in Stone supports McCurry. The thrust of his remarks in Stone was
that there is a need to develop alternatives to the exclusionary rule and habeas
corpus for the purpose of deterring police misconduct, not that termination of
habeas corpus is justified simply because there are alternative means of access
to federal courts. See 428 U.S. at 500-01 (Burger, C.J., concurring). Moreover,
the Chief Justice does not seem to believe that existing section 1983 actions are
an effective means of deterring fourth amendment violations. Cf. Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 421 (1971)
(Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("The problems of both error and deliberate misconduct by law enforcement officials call for a workable remedy. Private damage
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The McCurry exception 25 to collateral estoppel-allowing
federal collateral review of state rulings on fourth amendment
issues-is justifiable because it ensures that plaintiffs with
fourth amendment claims will have access to federal forums.
Moreover, the Eighth Circuit's approach is consistent with the
pre-Stone decisions in other circuits that justified application of
collateral estoppel in section 1983 actions on the availability of
federal habeas corpus relief. Finally, even though McCurry
provides a new opportunity for federal collateral review of
fourth amendment claims, it is compatible with the Stone decision. Section 1983 and federal habeas corpus actions differ substantially in terms of the congressional purposes behind their
enactment, the remedies they impose, and the effects they have
on the criminal justice system.
From a policy perspective, it is desirable to provide persons
with civil rights claims access to federal forums because federal
courts are likely to enforce certain federal constitutional rights
more rigorously and uniformly than state courts. First, state
judges might construe federal constitutional law in terms of loactions against individual police officers concededly have not adequately met
this requirement, and it would be fallacious to assume today's work of the
Court in creating a remedy will really accomplish its stated objective.").
Courts might also avoid applying collateral estoppel in section 1983 actions
by finding that the elements of collateral estoppel are not present. This position could be based oil a lack of mutuality between the parties, on the absence
of a jury at state suppression hearings, on differences in the burdens of proof
that must be met at civil and criminal trials, or on distinctions between the ultimate issues. See Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 20-23, McCurry v. Allen, 606
F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 1012 (1980). The McCurry court
apparently rejected this approach. See 606 F.2d at 798 n.10 (discussing Brubaker v. King, 505 F.2d 534, 536-38 (7th Cir. 1974)). Brubaker held that the issue of
probable cause litigated at a state suppression hearing is different from the issue in a section 1983 action of whether a law enforcement officer acted in good
faith and with reasonable belief that there was probable cause. Thus, the Seventh Circuit concluded that collateral estoppel could not apply. In McCurry,
the court dismissed this approach because "it would be very difficult, practically speaking, for a federal court to subsequently hold in a section 1983 claim
that officers were not acting in good faith or with 'reasonable belief' if the state
court has already held the search to be constitutional." 606 F.2d at 798 n.10
(emphasis in original).
25. Because the Eighth Circuit expressly limited its holding, this exception
applies only to plaintiffs whose access to the federal forum was affected by
Stone. See 606 F.2d at 798. The size of the group whose members have rights to
habeas relief that were affected by Stone is far from clear, but it is smaller than
the group whose members have claims based on violations of the fourth
amendment. Not all of these persons will be "in custody," a key criterion for a
federal habeas corpus action. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1976). On the other
hand, the group includes more than just persons who are incarcerated. 3 W.
LAFAvE, supra note 13, § 11(f), at 750 n.141; see note 65 infra and accompanying
text. For example, the "in custody" requirement has been interpreted to include persons on parole. See Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 243 (1963).
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cal conditions, rather than render judgments responsive to the
needs and values of the nation as a whole.26 Second, most state
judges must stand for reelection, and this might discourage
them from taking legally correct but unpopular stands.27 Third,
state courts are insulated from the unifying aspects of the federal system. For example, state judges are not obliged to follow
28
precedent established by United States circuit courts.
Since Stone eliminated federal habeas corpus review of
state fourth amendment rulings, the need for a forum in which
persons may relitigate their fourth amendment claims requires
an exception to the collateral estoppel rules traditionally followed in section 1983 actions. 29 Without such a provision, criminal defendants in state courts who desire federal forums for
their fourth amendment claims will be compelled to refrain
from moving for the suppression of evidence in order to avoid
preclusion of fourth amendment issues at a later trial. Failing
to move for suppression, however, would increase the likelihood of conviction in state court.30 Few criminal defendants
26. See Amsterdam, CriminalProsecutionsAffecting Federally Guaranteed
Civil Rights: FederalRemoval and Habeas Corpus Jurisdictionto Abort State
Court Trial, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 793, 801-03 (1965).
27. See Kates, Immunity of State Judges Under the Federal Civil Rights
Acts: Pierson v. Ray Reconsidered, 65 Nw. U.L. REv. 615, 639 (1970).
28. See McCormack, supra note 11, at 264.
29. An exception to the collateral estoppel rules followed in section 1983
actions brought subsequent to state criminal proceedings would not violate 28
U.S.C. § 1738 (1976). See Developments, supra note 5, at 1333-43. Section 1738
implements the full faith and credit clause, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1, and provides that federal courts must grant prior state determinations the same weight
as must courts in the state in which the rulings were made. Although one commentator has argued that an exception to section 1738 allowing federal civil
rights claimants to impeach prior state judgments would clearly violate the
statute, see Developments, supra note 5, at 1336, it is possible to justify a limited
exception allowing relitigation of certain issues determined at the earlier triaL.
Id. at 1338-43. In other words, a failure to apply the doctrine of merger and bar
would violate section 1738, but this does not rule out an exception based on collateral estoppel. An exception for collateral estoppel would not necessarily undermine the integrity of prior judgments. Id. at 1339. Further, without an
exception for collateral estoppel, litigants would be discouraged from raising
their fourth amendment claims in state trials. They would instead preserve the
claims for subsequent section 1983 actions. Removal of constitutional defenses
from state litigation cannot be viewed as a desirable result. Id. at 1340. Finally,
although an exception to the doctrine of merger and bar would contravene the
abstention doctrine of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the result would
not be the same for a McCurry-type exception to the doctrine of collateral estoppel because the interference with the operations of state courts would not
be as great. See Developments, supra note 5, at 1341-42.
30. See Clark v. Lutcher, 436 F. Supp. 1266, 1272 (M.D. Pa. 1977) (citing Moran v. Mitchell, 354 F. Supp. 86, 88 (E.D. Va. 1973) ("If traditional concepts of
collateral estoppel apply, then, a state defendant is faced with a Hobson's
choice.")).
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would be likely to take such a risk, and access to the federal
courts would therefore be effectively denied. This result would
undermine the special federal interest in providing a federal forum for fourth amendment claims.
Recent Supreme Court doctrine, however, is hostile to the
argument that such an interest exists. 31 In Stone, the Supreme
Court rejected the notion that all claims based on constitutional violations deserve access to a federal forum:
Despite differences in institutional environment and the unsympathetic attitude to federal constitutional claims of some state judges in
years past, we are unwilling to assume that there now exists a general
lack of appropriate sensitivity to constitutional
rights in the trial and
32
appellate courts of the several States.

Because the Supreme Court has rejected the proposition that
there is a need for federal habeas relief when fourth amendment claims exist, it might appear that there is little basis for
the McCurry exception to the doctrine of collateral estoppel. A
habeas corpus action, in which personal liberty is at stake, has
more important consequences than a section 1983 action for
damages, in which no such liberty is at issue.33 The court recognized that its position in McCurry seemed contrary to
Stone,34 but did not attempt to demonstrate that the two decisions can coexist.
The McCurry court might have emphasized that the effective denial of federal forums for section 1983 actions undermines the primary purpose of the statute. Section 1983, which
was enacted as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1871,35 owes its
existence to a congressional belief that state courts were inade31. See cases cited in note 32 infra.
32. 428 U.S. at 493-94 n.35. The Court suggested that the possibility of
Supreme Court review of the decisions of state supreme courts was sufficient
to ensure uniformity in the application of the fourth amendment and the
supremacy clause. See id. In recent cases prior to Stone, the Court voiced a
similar unwillingness to assume that state courts are inadequate forums for
constitutional claims. See, e.g., Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 611 (1975);
Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 460-61 (1974); Palmore v. United States, 411
U.S. 389, 407-08 (1973).
33. See Palma v. Powers, 295 F. Supp. 924, 937-38 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
34. See 606 F.2d at 799. It is not surprising that the Eighth Circuit is hostile
to the Stone result. The Supreme Court combined Stone with a case in which
the Eighth Circuit had affirmed a federal district court's grant of habeas corpus
to an incarcerated person who claimed that the evidence used to convict him
was gained through an unconstitutional search. In Stone, the Supreme Court
reversed that Eighth Circuit case. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 471-74
(1975).
35. Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (current version at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1976)).
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quate forums for litigating civil rights claims. 36 Thus, even if it

is within the Supreme Court's authority to determine whether
collateral habeas relief is necessary for persons with fourth
amendment claims, 37 the Court lacks authority to make a similar determination when civil rights actions based on the Act of
1871 are involved. 38 To make federal forums unavailable in
36. Section 1983 was originally known as the "Ku Klux Klan Act," and was
adopted to implement the fourteenth amendment. Congress believed that a
civil remedy in federal courts was essential because it doubted the willingness
of state courts to determine civil rights claims.
The United States courts are further above mere local influence than
the county courts; their judges can act with more independence, cannot
be put under terror, as local judges can; their sympathies are not so
We believe we can
nearly identified with those of the vicinage ....
trust our United States courts, and we propose to do so.
CoNG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 460 (1871) (remarks of Rep. Coburn). See
Theis, supra note 8, at 866-68.
Courts have recognized that section 1983 was enacted to provide a federal
forum for civil rights litigants. See, e.g., Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242
(1972) (Congress clearly conceived that it was altering the relationship between states and the nation with respect to protection of federally created
rights); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 180 (1961) (Civil Rights Act passed because prejudice, passion, neglect, or intolerance might cause rights guaranteed
by the fourteenth amendment to be denied by states), overruled on other
grounds, Monell v. Department of Social Servs. of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 701
(1978); Rimmer v. Fayetteville Police Dep't, 567 F.2d 273, 276 (4th Cir. 1977)
(general purpose of Civil Rights Act was to provide access to federal forum for
adjudication of federal constitutional rights). Although the Civil Rights Act of
1871 was adopted in response to the particular conditions of the post-Civil War
era, its general purposes still apply today. See 365 U.S. at 183.
37. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493 n.35 (1976). The assumptions
made in Stone supporting the adequacy of state rulings on civil rights claims
are contrary to other modern Supreme Court rulings. See, e.g., England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 416 (1964) (mere possibility
of direct Supreme Court review of state court decision not sufficient to ensure
protection of federal civil rights). Moreover, commentators have questioned
the validity of these assumptions. See, e.g., Robbins & Sanders, supra note 13,
at 71-72.
38. Federal habeas corpus relief was extended during the post-Civil War
era to persons convicted by state courts. See Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14
Stat. 385 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1976)). Congress took this action
to promote the goals of reconstruction and of the fourteenth amendment. See
Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 401 n.9, 417 (1963). It might be argued that if the
Supreme Court can determine that federal forums no longer serve any special
purpose in habeas corpus actions, see Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493 n.35
(1976), then it can also determine that the post-Civil War conditions necessitating a federal forum in section 1983 actions no longer exist. There are, however,
a number of important distinctions between federal habeas corpus and section
1983 actions insofar as fourth amendment claims are concerned. First, Congress requires the exhaustion of state remedies as a precondition for habeas,
see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1976), but not for section 1983. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 515-18 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting). This difference belies
Congress' desire to give section 1983 plaintiffs immediate access to federal forums. Second, the fourth amendment habeas action was, in large part, a judicial creation. See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 39-40 (1949) (Black, J.,
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cases like McCurry would clearly violate congressional intent.3 9
Although prior to Stone many federal courts made state
criminal court rulings binding on section 1983 claimants, the application of collateral estoppel to section 1983 plaintiffs after
Stone in cases involving fourth amendment rights would show
a great disregard for the intent of the framers of the Civil
Rights Act of 1871. The ability to bring a habeas corpus action
indirectly preserves the possibility of gaining access to a federal forum for a section 1983 action. If a criminal defendant is
successful in his habeas action, the prior state judgment no
longer has collateral estoppel effect and he can proceed with
his section 1983 action. 40 After Stone, no such possibility exists
for persons with fourth amendment claims.
Habeas corpus and section 1983 actions differ not only in
legislative origin, but also in the impact their distinct remedies
have on the operation of the criminal justice system. Because
of this difference in impact, section 1983 actions dealing with
fourth amendment claims should be allowed even if habeas
corpus actions are not. In the majority opinion in Stone, Justice Powell analyzed fourth amendment habeas claims within
the framework of the exclusionary rule,41 pointing out that the
'primary" value of the rule is deterrence of police misconduct.42 Thus, the policy justification for allowing federal habeas
corpus actions to review the constitutionality of searches and
seizures is valid only to the extent that such habeas actions afconcurring) (exclusionary rule is a judicially created rule of evidence). There
is dispute about whether the 1867 habeas act was originally intended to provide
anything more than a way to attack the jurisdiction of a state court. Compare
Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 402-06 (1963) with id. at 452 (Harlan, J., dissenting). In
contrast, section 1983 was from its inception clearly intended to provide access
to federal courts for plaintiffs with substantive constitutional claims. See note
36 supra and accompanying text. It is only in recent years, however, that the
Supreme Court has begun to make section 1983 an effective remedy. See Developments, supra note 5, at 1169-70.
39. Even if the Supreme Court is correct that the possibility of gaining review of state court decisions upon certiorari obviates the need for federal
habeas corpus, see Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493 n.35 (1976), the possibility
of certiorari seems to fall far short of satisfying the intent of the Civil Rights
Act. See note 36 supra and accompanying text.
40. See Rimmer v. Fayetteville Police Dep't, 567 F.2d 273, 277 (4th Cir. 1977)
(dictum); Mastracchio v. Ricci, 498 F.2d 1257, 1260 n.2 (1st Cir. 1974).
41. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 481 (1976).
42. Id. at 486. In Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), which extended the exclusionary rule to state courts, the majority opinion cited "judicial integrity" as
an additional justification for excluding illegally obtained evidence. Id. at 659.
In Stone, the Court undercut this justification, noting that considerations of judicial integrity have played only a "limited role . . . in the determination
whether to apply the [exclusionary] rule in a particular context." 428 U.S. at
485.
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fect police behavior. Justice Powell used a balancing test to analyze this relationship. He first weighed the "utility of the
exclusionary rule against the costs of extending it to collateral
review of Fourth Amendment claims."43 His conclusion was
that the exclusionary rule has high costs because it "deflects
the truthfinding process and often frees the guilty," 44 and that
these costs "persist" when the rule is applied in collateral review. 45 Assessing the benefits conferred by fourth amendment
habeas corpus actions, Justice Powell expressed the belief that
the additional deterrence of police misconduct is "small in rela46
tion to the costs."
Section 1983 actions fare better under this balancing test.
The social costs of section 1983 actions are not as high because
such actions do not culminate in the release of guilty persons
from custody.47 In addition, the benefits may be more significant. The deterrence of police misconduct that would result
from allowing section 1983 actions for damages against police
officers and municipalities might be far greater than that
achieved by applying the exclusionary rule upon collateral review. The threat of monetary liability is likely to have a greater
impact than the prospect of losing a conviction. 48 Moreover, in
43. 428 U.S. at 489.
44. Id. at 490.
45. Id. at 491.
46. Id. at 493.
47. See notes 49-54 infra and accompanying text.
48. Many believe that the reason the exclusionary rule fails as a means of
deterring police misconduct is that it does not directly affect individual police
officers or their employers. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of
Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 416 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Geller, Enforcing the Fourth Amendment: The Exclusionary Rule and its Alternatives, 1975 WASH. U. LQ. 621, 665-66. Proposals for improving deterrence
include new means of extracting damages from law enforcement officers and
government units. See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 500-01 (1976) (Burger,
C.J., concurring); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 422-23 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); S. SCHLISINGER, EXCLUSIONARY INJUSTICE 77-84 (1977). For the most part, existing section 1983 and
common law tort actions are viewed as inadequate substitutes for the exclusionary rule because they are not applicable to all fourth amendment violations, because of the difficulties which a plaintiff faces in trying to win his suit,
and because defendants are too often judgment proof. Geller, supra, at 691-95;
Wright, Must the Criminal Go Free If the Constable Blunders?, 50 Tax. L Rv.
736, 738 (1972). See generally Foote, Tort Remedies for Police Violations of Individual Rights, 39 MImN. I- REv. 493 (1955). Indeed, the reason the exclusionary
rule was imposed on the states in Mapp was concern over the efficacy of existing alternatives. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 651-53 (1961). Even though
section 1983 actions are not viewed as a suitable replacement for the exclusionary rule, these actions-such as McCurry's, in which the plaintiff asked for
$1,000,000 in damages--are likely to have some deterrent effect if the plaintiffs
are successful. But see Project, Suing the Police in Federal Court, 88 YALE L.J.
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cases like McCurry it is a mistake to assess the benefits of collateral review solely in terms of deterrence. Section 1983 also
49
serves as a vehicle for victim compensation.
A possible criticism of McCurry is that it might lead to new
opportunities for federal habeas actions, a result inconsistent
with Stone. A convicted criminal could initiate a section 1983
damage action5 0 in a case in which he would have sought
habeas corpus relief before Stone. If he prevailed, he could argue that the decision, which would necessarily be based on a
finding of an unconstitutional search and seizure, is evidence
that he was denied "an opportunity for fulland fair litigation of
a Fourth Amendment claim" in the state court.5 ' He could then
seek federal habeas relief under the exception to Stone that allows review in cases in which the litigant was denied this op52
portunity.
For a number of reasons, however, this concern seems unfounded. The mere existence of a contrary federal determination would not have much probative value in ascertaining
whether an opportunity for full and fair litigation was provided
at the state level. The difference in outcomes could be due to
differences between the triers of fact or between the records
assembled at the two trials. Even if the contrary judgments
could be explained solely by divergent interpretations of the
781, 810-12 (1979) (even if successful, section 1983 actions are ineffectual deterrents to police misconduct because municipal employees are indemnified by
their employers or insurance companies).
Today, section 1983 actions are somewhat more effective than they were at
the time of Mapp. S. SCHLESINGER, supra,at 81-84. In Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S.
167, 183-87 (1961), the Supreme Court held that the section 1983 requirement of
a deprivation under the "color" of a statute includes cases in which police
abuse their official positions. In Monell v. Department of Social Servs. of New
York, 436 U.S. 658, 663 (1978), the Court held that under certain circumstances
section 1983 relief could be obtained from local government units. The
Supreme Court has, however, set significant limits on section 1983 relief in recent years. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 378-80 (1976); Pierson v. Ray, 386
U.S. 547, 557 (1967). Nevertheless, there is potential for expansion of the remedy and for further enhancement of its deterrent effect. See McCormack, supra
note 11, at 288 n.201.
49. Victim compensation may in fact be its primary purpose. See Bivens v.
Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397
(1971) (not material whether money damages are necessary to enforce fourth
amendment); id. at 407-08 (Harlan, J., concurring) (award of compensation for
violation of fourth amendment rights does not turn on deterrent effect).
50. It is not possible to bring a section 1983 action for release from custody.
See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 488-90 (1973); Curley v. Bryan, 362 F.
Supp. 48, 51 (D.S.C. 1973).
51. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976).
52. Such a result obviously would undermine the Supreme Court's policy
in Stone of limiting fourth amendment litigation. See id. at 494-95.
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Constitution, this would not necessarily mean that the state forum was inadequate. The Stone opinion provides only minimal
guidance on the meaning of a full and fair opportunity for litigation. 53 Since Stone, a number of federal courts have ruled
that the erroneous nature of a state court determination of a
search and seizure issue is not a sufficient ground for a federal
habeas hearing. 54 Although a state court might be deemed inadequate if it blatantly misapplied federal law,55 in such clearcut cases a successful section 1983 action would not be of much
additional value in demonstrating that an opportunity for full
and fair litigation was denied.
Despite the possibility of reconciling Stone and McCurry,
other criticisms of McCurry remain. These include the likelihood that McCurry would increase the number of section 1983
actions, foster the existence of contrary state and federal decisions, and apply only to plaintiffs "in custody." Each of these
criticisms is balanced, however, by countervailing considerations.
It could be argued that McCurry will create an undue burden for the federal courts by increasing the already large volume of section 1983 litigation. Since the early 1960s, the volume
of civil rights actions brought in federal court by state prisoners
has increased dramatically, 6 causing some commentators to
call for greater restrictions. 57 Although judicial economy was
53. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 & n.36 (1975); 3 W. LAFAvE, supra
note 13, at 754. See generally Comment, Habeas Corpus After Stone v. Powelh
The "Opportunityfor Full and FairLitigation" Standard,13 HARv.C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 521 (1978). Regardless of the limited guidance the Supreme Court has
provided on what constitutes "an opportunity for full and fair litigation," it
would not seem logical after Stone for the Court to say that a procedurally fair
state decision was subject to federal habeas review simply because it was at
odds with a federal court decision. Stone and its companion case were instances in which state and federal courts differed on the constitutionality of a
search and seizure and the Supreme Court denied federal habeas.
54. E.g., Holmberg v. Parratt, 548 F.2d 745, 746 (8th Cir.) ("Erroneous application of Fourth Amendment principles by a state court is no longer relevant to
the question of whether the federal court may review the merits of the claim."),
cert. denied, 431 U.S. 969 (1977).
55. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Maxey v. Morris, 591 F-2d 386, 390 (7th
Cir. 1979) (correctness of state court determination can be factor if state court
is "flagrantly disregarding" a United States Supreme Court opinion) (dictum);
Gamble v. Oklahoma, 583 F.2d 1161, 1165 (10th Cir. 1978) ("'Opportunity for full
and fair consideration'. . . contemplates recognition and at least colorable application of the correct Fourth Amendment constitutional standards.").

56. See

DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES

CoURTs, ANNUAL REPORT 190 (1976). See also Monell v. Department of Social
Servs. of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 724 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (commenting on "the torrent of civil rights litigation of the last 17 years").
57. E.g., H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 90-100
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not a major concern expressed by the Court in Stone, it was
mentioned as one of the reasons for limiting collateral review
of previously litigated matters.5 8
Imposing collateral estoppel in cases like McCurry would
hold down the volume of section 1983 litigation, but it would
also undercut the purposes of the Civil Rights Act of 1871.59
Congress provided section 1983 relief to protect civil rights, and
the grant of jurisdiction was not to be delimited by judicial determinations concerning the capacity of federal courts to handle additional suits. 60 Moreover, the McCurry exception
applies only to a small group of cases in which there is a special need after Stone for access to a federal forum. The amount
of litigation engendered by McCurry will not, for example, even
approach that which would result from a general exception to
collateral estoppel in section 1983.61
Although the additional volume of section 1983 cases that
will follow McCurry is not likely to be substantial, there may
be problems with allowing even a small number of contrary
state and federal judgments on a constitutional issue to exist.
It seems unfair that a federal court could hold that a plaintiff's
conviction was obtained by illegal means but, nonetheless,
deny him his freedom. This is a criticism of Stone, not McCurry; it is only because Stone denies such a plaintiff habeas
corpus relief that he cannot seek his freedom. From the plaintiff's point of view, while his captivity may seem all the more
unfair after a favorable section 1983 decision, compensation in
the form of money damages is better than nothing at all.
Another related difficulty is that allowing a judgment to
stand after a contrary federal ruling may tend to undermine respect for the judicial system. 62 Assuming that admission of the
(1973); Aldisert, JudicialExpansion of FederalJurisdiction: A FederalJudge's
Thoughts on Section 1983, Comity and the FederalCaseload, 1973 LAw & Soc.
ORD.557, 574-78.
58. 428 U.S. at 491 n.31.
59. See Theis, supra note 8, at 881-82.
60. Cf. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821) (Marshall,
C.J.) (courts "have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is
given than to usurp that which is not given").
61. In addition, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide methods for
quickly dealing with frivolous petitions. See FED. R. Crv. P. 12(b) (6) (failure to
state claim); FED. R. Crv. P. 56 (summary judgment).
62. See Developments, supra note 5, at 1333 (by preserving the integrity of
prior judgments, res judicata promotes respect for the first court); cf. Stone v.
Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 491 n.31 (1976) (concern for 'Tinality in criminal trials" and
"minimization of friction between our federal and state systems of justice")
(quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 259 (1973) (Powell, J., con-

curring)).
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illegally obtained evidence in state court was not harmless error, a successful section 1983 action suggests that the state conviction was illegitimate. 63 But given the assumption that Stone
will continue to bar federal habeas relief, the public's image of
the judicial system might be less tarnished if plaintiffs like McCurry, who have suffered violations of their civil rights, are able
to recover damages, rather than if such plaintiffs go entirely uncompensated.
A final problem with the McCurry exception to collateral
estoppel is that it would vanish as soon as the criminal is out of
custody. The exception applies only to persons who are denied
federal habeas relief by Stone,64 and habeas is, for the most
part, available only to persons in custody. 65 It is doctrinally unsatisfying to have the exception terminate at the end of custody. This adds to the complexity of the law and makes the
period of punishment the only time during which relief for vio63. It is interesting to note that the Supreme Court tends to de-emphasize
the loss of respect for the judicial system associated with public awareness that
a conviction turned on the use of illegally obtained evidence. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 484-86 (1976).
64. See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
65. See 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 13, at 750 n.141. If a person files a habeas
suit but is released before adjudication, however, he can still proceed with the
suit. See Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 237 (1968).
If a plaintiff must be "in custody" to take advantage of the McCurry exception, it might seem that he should also have to exhaust state remedies, as in a
federal habeas action. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1977). If not, it would appear
that the McCurry exception applies to a broader class of plaintiffs than those
whose access to a federal forum was affected by Stone. Although the court in
McCurry did not explicitly require exhaustion of state remedies, its mandate
that the district court stay action on McCurry's claim until the Missouri courts
reached a final decision on the appeal of his criminal conviction, see note 7
supra, may amount to the same thing.
The court in McCurry did not reveal whether it would have required McCurry to exhaust his opportunities for direct review in the state courts if he
had not already initiated his appeal. Some courts seem to require exhaustion
in such cases. See Meadows v. Evans, 529 F.2d 385, 386 (5th Cir. 1976) (requiring exhaustion on the ground of comity when section 1983 action for damages
goes to validity of conviction). There are reasons why a general exhaustion of
remedies requirement is inappropriate for the McCurry exception to collateral
estoppel. Foremost among them is that immediate access to a federal forum is
one of the hallmarks of section 1983 relief. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
475, 515-18 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Further, although the requirement
of direct appeal through state courts is sensible in the context of federal habeas
corpus-when the federal remedy of release from custody amounts to roughly
the same thing as would be gained through a successful state appeal-section
1983 damages are an entirely different kind of remedy. Finally, even though exhaustion of state remedies is a condition for federal habeas relief, dispensing
with that requirement for the McCurry exception would not significantly increase the number of plaintiffs who can take advantage of the remedy; it would
simply move the timing of their federal suits forward.
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lation is available. Perhaps the ultimate solution for this problem would be to waive the "in custody" requirement fortaking
advantage of the McCurry exception for those individuals who
at some earlier point were in custody and were unable to obtain federal review of their fourth amendment claims by means
66
of habeas corpus.
Even though McCurry allows federal collateral review of
state criminal court rulings on fourth amendment issues, it is
compatible with Stone. The Supreme Court's decision in Stone
has had a significant impact on access to federal forums for
those with fourth amendment claims, heralding an era of diminished rights for criminal defendants. If, however, McCurry
is allowed to stand with Stone, and courts follow the Eighth
Circuit's lead, the restrictive effects of Stone on fourth amendment liberties will not be as great.

66. Normal rules regarding statutes of limitations for section 1983 actions
would still apply.

